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Abstract
This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise
determine an agency’s total surplus within an linear agency framework with
multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back
to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition, it
generalizes this index to a more general cost function, thereby highlight-
ing the context specificity of the original criterion. Finally, it suggests a
redefinition of tasks under which the criterion prevails.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 15 years, the linear principal-agent framework has become an in-
creasingly popular device for studying a variety of questions concerning the pro-
vision of incentives. Its main attraction is its analytical tractability, which allows
for closed form solutions even in situations for which results are hardly derived
in the standard principal agent model. One such situation is the now familiar
multi-task agency model, in which the agent provides a diversity of actions. By
the analysis of such situations, the aspect of performance measure congruity—
which is absent in the single-action standard agency framework—has become an
important subject in the performance measurement literature. Starting with the
work of Feltham and Xie (1994), several papers (Baker (2000, 2002); Datar et al.
(2001)) have used the setting, thereby deriving metrics of (in-)congruity. All of
these metrics try to capture the welfare effects due to the misalignment of per-
formance measures with the principal’s objective, some of them in absolute and
some in relative terms. All of them, however, build on a specific cost function
in which actions are independent and marginal costs are equal among tasks. In
particular, they are capable of identifying the lowest misallocation of effort only
for this class of cost functions (Schnedler (2003)).
We take up this deficiency and derive a more general measure of congruity
that adjusts and generalizes the measure previously proposed by Baker (2000,
2002). We show that this measure naturally arises from a decomposition of the
agency’s net surplus. We then return to the initial objection and show that under
an alternative representation of the agency problem, the shortcoming no longer
endures. The main feature of this adaptation is a redefinition of task, restoring
the separability of the cost function.
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The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 recapitulates
the linear agency framework to derive an adjusted version of Baker’s measure
of congruity. Section 3 generalizes this model to incorporate interactive actions,
thereby deriving a generalized measure of congruity. Section 4 finally provides a
redefinition of the agent’s tasks to restore the initial measure of congruity. Section
5 concludes.
2 Independent tasks and an intuitive metric of congruity
Consider a situation in which an agent influences the net present value of his
principal by exerting a multidimensional a ∈ Rn which cannot be legally enforced.
Neither the principal’s net present value V (a) = d′a =
∑n
i=1 diai of this activity
nor the cost C(a) accruing to the agent is verifiable. In this section, we assume
that the agent’s cost of taking action a is given by:
C(a) =
1
2
a′a =
1
2
n∑
i=1
a2i . (1)
This cost function is used in most linear agency models, merely for mathematical
convenience. In the next section, we present a more general cost function. It
then becomes apparent that the metrics of congruity proposed in the literature
build on the specific cost function of (1).
To motivate the agent for the activity, the principal has to rely on a per-
formance measure P (a) = y′a + ² =
∑n
i=1 yiai + ², where yi ∈ R denotes the
performance measure’s sensitivity with respect to action ai, and ² ∼ N(0, σ2) is
a normal error term reflecting the uncertainty related to measure P .
The agent is effort- and risk-averse, which is reflected by an exponential utility
function U(S, a) = − exp (−r(S − C(a)), where S is any transfer received and r
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is the Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Given this specification,
the agent’s preferences can equally be represented by his certainty equivalent
CE(S, a) = S − C(a)− r
2
σ2. The principal remunerates the agent using a linear
compensation scheme S = s0+ sP . The reservation level of the agent’s certainty
equivalent is CER.
The principal’s contracting problem in this model is a special case of that an-
alyzed by Feltham and Xie (1994), who allow for multiple performance measures.
By choosing s, the principal maximizes the expected total surplus V (a)−C(a)−
r
2
σ2, subject to the the incentive compatibility constraint a = sy. The optimal
contract parameter is s = d
′y
y′y+rσ2
, from which the agency’s net total surplus
ΠSBRA =
1
2
(d′y)2
y′y + rσ2
(2)
can be derived (Feltham and Xie 1994, p. 433).
Using this simple framework, measures of congruity and risk can easily be
derived by ceteris paribus comparisons. In detail, we compare:
1. The net total surplus of the agency under first-best to that under second-
best with a risk-neutral agent. This comparison provides a measure of
congruity.
2. The net total surplus under second-best with a risk-neutral agent to that
under second-best with a risk-averse agent. From this we derive an index
of the risk incorporated in the performance measure.
Since both measures are defined as ratios of total surplus numbers, the second-
best surplus equals the first-best surplus, multiplied by the respective measures
of congruity and risk. The measures are computed as follows:
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1. Congruity: The total surplus under first-best conditions,
ΠFB =
(d′d)
2
, (3)
results from (2) with y = d and r = 0. The total surplus
ΠSBRN =
(d′y)2
2y′y
(4)
under second-best and risk neutrality results from r = 0 and arbitrary
sensitivities y. Relating (4) to (3), a measure
φ(d,y) =
ΠSBRN
ΠFB
=
(d′y)2
(y′y)(d′d)
= (cos(β))2 (5)
of congruity can be defined, where β is the angle between the vectors d
and y. The cosine of β has already been promoted by Baker (2000, 2002)
as a measure of congruity. By reference to the squared cosine, the present
measure is scaled to the unit interval and monotonically relates congruity
to surplus numbers.
2. Risk: Relating the total surplus (4) under second-best and risk neutrality
to the second-best total surplus (2) under risk aversion, a measure ψ of risk
can be defined by
ψ(y, σ2) =
ΠSBRA
ΠSBRN
=
(y′y)
(y′y) + rσ2
=
1
1 + r σ
2
y′y
.
Using the term σ
2
y′y
in the denominator of ψ, the signal’s variance is normal-
ized with respect to the marginal products y of the performance measure.
Referring to Banker and Datar (1989), it can be denoted as the signal’s
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intensity with respect to a. Borrowing from the engineering terminology,
its reciprocal value is also referred to as the signal-to-noise ratio of y (e.g.
Baker 2002, p. 732).
Applying the above definitions, the total surplus of an agency in the linear
model with a separable quadratic cost function can be decomposed in the follow-
ing manner:
ΠSBRA = Π
FBφ(d,y)ψ(y, σ2).
The metrics φ(d,y) and ψ(y, σ2) quantify the performance measure’s relative
effectiveness with respect to congruity and precision.
3 Interactive tasks
The cost function in (1) assumes that the agent’s actions are completely indepen-
dent. To capture interaction between tasks, a generalized quadratic cost function
Cˆ(a) = a′Ka (6)
can be used, where K denotes a positive definite and symmetric (n× n)-matrix.
Cˆ(a) is identical to C(a) for K = I/2. Moreover, the quadratic form in (6) is
capable of covering almost any degree of complementarity and substitutability.
With regard to marginal cost, it provides a linear approximation of any convex
cost function, as considered by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991). From the gen-
eralized cost function, the agent’s action choice becomes a(s,K,y) = s
2
K−1y.
Substitution in the principal’s optimization problem yields a net total surplus of
ΠSBRA =
1
4
(d′K−1y)2
y′K−1y + 2rσ2
. (7)
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Applying the above measure of risk to the modified model, a paradox seem-
ingly emerges: under the generalized cost function, an unbiased performance
measure in general does not maximize total surplus in a class of performance
measures with identical signal-to-noise ratio (Schnedler 2003). The paradox is
exemplified by the following example:
Example 1 Let d = (1, 0)′ determine the result of the agent’s two-dimensional
effort. We compare two performance measures, P 1 = d′a + ²1 and P
2 = y′a +
²2, with y = (1, 1)
′, ²1 ∼ N(0, 1) and ²2 ∼ N(0, 2). Thus, (i) P 1 is perfectly
congruent with the principal’s objective, whereas P 2 is distorted; and (ii) both
measures exhibit the same signal-to-noise ratio d′d/σ21 = y
′y/σ22 = 1. According
to the above measures φ and ψ, P 1 should be preferred to P 2.
Now consider the agent’s cost of effort (6) with
K =


1 −1
2
−1
2
1

 .
The two tasks are complements: The marginal cost of one action decreases the
level of the other. Consequently, the actions under both performance measures
tend to balance the two tasks. Optimization yields a(s,K,d) = s
(
2
3
, 1
3
)
′
and
a(s,K,y) = s (1, 1)′. The modified cost function alleviates the consequences of
the incongruity of P 2. Nevertheless, the action under P 2 is still distorted, whereas
under P 1 the first-best action
(
2
3
, 1
3
)
′
can be induced.
Inspection of the second-best solutions
ΠSB,P
1
RA =
1
4
·
(
4
3
)2
4
3
+ 2r
and ΠSB,P
2
RA =
1
4
· 2
2
4 + 4r
,
however, reveals that for a sufficiently risk-averse agent, the principal prefers
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P 2 to P 1: for r > 2 the principal’s second-best profit is strictly less under the
unbiased performance measure P 1.
The example seems to conflict with the proposed decomposition of congruity
and risk effects: if risk effects can be expressed as a function of the signal-to-noise
ratio, then signals of identical signal-to-noise relation should be comparable with
respect to the above measure of congruity. The example contradicts this intuition.
The discrepancy arises from the definition of risk associated with a perfor-
mance measure. This becomes clear when we take a similar approach to that
in the preceding section in order to separate the effects of congruity and risk.
Working along the lines of Section 2, we obtain:
1. Congruity: The net total surplus under first-best now equals
ΠFB =
(d′K−1d)
4
.
Relating this to the net total surplus under second-best and risk neutrality,
ΠSBRN =
(d′K−1y)2
4y′K−1y
, (8)
a modified measure of congruity can be defined as
φˆ(d,K,y) =
ΠSBRN
ΠFB
=
(d′K−1y)2
(y′K−1y)(d′Kd)
. (9)
Comparing φˆ(d,K,y) to φ(d,y), it emerges that the cosine interpretation
is no longer apparent under the generalized cost function. Congruity is now
a function not only of marginal products d and y, but also of the agent’s
cost function determined byK. The reason for this change is quite obvious:
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what really matters is not a performance measure’s degree of alignment with
the principal’s objective per se, but the alignment of the resulting efforts
with the first-best action choice. If all actions are independent and equally
costly [as in the cost function (1)], the two comparisons yields identical
results because aFB = d and aSB = sy. Under the general cost function
(6), however, the first-best action aFB = 1
2
K−1d as well as the second best
action aSB = s
2
K−1y depends on K. A substitution of aFB and aSB for d
and y in the cosine formula (5) yields the generalized measure (9), which
therefore describes the squared cosine of the angle γ between the first-best
and second-best effort vectors.
This effect is illustrated in Figure 1, which takes up the data of example
1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Here, the original cosine criterion highly underestimates the alignment of
Performance measure P 2 with the principal’s interests. While Baker’s con-
gruity index φ(d,y) = 1
2
refers to the angle β between the vectors d and
y, the modified measure φˆ = 3
4
refers to the smaller angle γ between the
first-best and the second-best action. Obviously, γ indicates a much greater
congruity than β.
Note that despite the modification of φ, an unbiased performance mea-
sure with y = d still leads to the maximal congruity of 1. This is worth
mentioning because of the paradox described in the example. Since in the
present decomposition the principal’s profit monotonically increases in the
congruity measure φˆ, the conflict must arise from the definition of risk.
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2. Risk: Relating the net total surplus in (8) under second-best and risk neu-
trality to the respective net total surplus (7) under risk aversion, the mea-
sure of risk becomes
ψˆ(y,K, σ2) =
ΠSBRN
ΠFB
=
(y′Ky)
(y′Ky) + 2rσ2
=
1
1 + 2σ
2
y′Ky
, (10)
which obviously is not in line with the signal-to-noise ratio described above.
Different to the case of a separable quadratic cost function of equally costly
tasks, the signal’s variance is normalized with respect to the marginal prod-
uct y of the performance measure, related to the respective marginal cost
of effort. Therefore, performance measures of equal signal-to-noise ratio
are no longer equally risky in the modified notion of risk. A justification
of the risk measure in (10) is straightforward: if the marginal cost of a
particular action is high, the agent will spend only low effort on this task.
Consequently, a performance measure’s sensitivity with respect to this task
should have only a minor impact on a risk metric associated with that task.
Similar to congruity, what matters is not a performance measure’s risk per
se, but the risk resulting from the agent’s consequential action. This is
exactly accounted for by rescaling the variance σ2 by y′K−1y instead of
y′y.
In the example, the original signal-to-noise ratio overestimates the risk as-
sociated with performance measure P 2, compared to that of P 1. Applying
the risk metric (10), the modified signal-to-noise ratio y′K−1y/σ22 = 4 of
P 2 is higher than that of P 1, which amounts to d′K−1d/σ21 = 8/3. Thus,
P 1 and P 2 do not belong to the same risk class under the modified cost
function. Since P 2 is now “less risky” than P 1, for a sufficiently risk-averse
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agent the higher precision outweighs its lower incongruity, and the principal
is better off using the distorted measure.
4 Redefinition of tasks and independent actions
Since the difference in the congruity indexes in (5) and (9) is caused by the
matrix K determining the agent’s cost of effort, it is worthwhile inspecting how
K relates the cost functions (1) and (6). If K is a scalar matrix (proportionate
to the identity matrix I), all actions are independent and equally costly. The
initial cost function (1) can then be derived from the generalized cost function
(6) by simple rescaling. If K is diagonal, the different actions are independent,
but of different marginal cost. In this case, the initial cost function is obtained by
rescaling the different actions by their respective marginal cost. These two cases
are obvious and have already been treated in the literature (Schnedler 2003).
If the matrix K is not diagonal, however, the marginal cost of one action in
principle depends on the chosen level of another, and the cost function C cannot
be obtained by simply rescaling.
It can be restored, however, by a proper redefinition of tasks: Since K is pos-
itive definite and symmetric, it is diagonalizable, i.e., there exists an orthogonal
(n× n)-matrix U such that:
K = UQU−1, (11)
where Q is a diagonal matrix, the elements of which are the eigenvalues of K
(Sydsaeter et al. 1999, p. 137). This can be used to give an alternative presen-
tation of the principal’s optimization problem with independent actions. To this
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end, we substitute the diagonalized matrix K in the general cost function (6),
Cˆ(a) = a′UQU−1a = a′UQU′a,
where the equality follows from the property UU′ = I of orthogonal matrices
(Sydsaeter et al. 1999, p. 141). By defining actions a˜ = U′a, we obtain a
separable cost function
Cˆ(a˜) = a˜′Qa˜.
In a second step, actions can be rescaled to aˆ = Q
1
2 a˜ in order to generate a cost
function of the form given in (1):
Cˆ(aˆ) = aˆ′aˆ.
Redefining tasks, however, requires rewriting of the principal’s gross benefit and
the agent’s performance measure. From the two steps of the redefinition of tasks,
we have aˆ = Q
1
2U′a or a = UQ−
1
2 aˆ. Substitution yields
V (aˆ) = d′a = d′UQ−
1
2 aˆ = dˆ′aˆ,
where dˆ = Q−
1
2U′d denotes the marginal products of the redefined tasks. Simi-
larly, yˆ = Q−
1
2U′y can be defined as the sensitivities of the performance measures
with respect to these tasks, yielding a performance measure P (aˆ) = yˆ′aˆ+ ².
Application of this procedure to the example renders
Q =


3
2
0
0 1
2

 and U = 1√
2


−1 1
1 1

 .
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The redefined tasks are aˆ1 =
√
3 (a2 − a1) /2 and aˆ2 = (a1 + a2) /2. After
redefining marginal products dˆ = Q−
1
2U′d =
(
1/
√
3, 1
)′
and sensitivities yˆ =
Q−
1
2U′y = (0, 2)′, the original cosine criterion in fact is in line with the above
definition of congruity:
φ(dˆ, yˆ) =
(dˆ′yˆ)2
(yˆ′yˆ)(dˆ′dˆ)
=
(0 + 2)2
(0 + 4)
(
1
3
+ 1
) = 3
4
.
On inspection of the example, a shortcoming of the redefinition of tasks be-
comes obvious: the redefined action aˆ1 =
√
3 (a2 − a1) /2 is not naturally in-
terpretable as a combination of different tasks because it includes negative lev-
els of action a1. This fact holds for any redefinition as described above: since
{aˆ1, . . . , aˆn} form an orthonormal basis for the action space Rn, any such basis
different from the natural basis [which is given for the separable cost function
(1)] will comprise negative entries in its base vectors.1 Consequently, at least one
action cannot be interpreted as ‘doing parts of the original tasks’.
5 Conclusion
This note has revisited the subject of performance measure congruity in a linear
agency setting. Building on the previous work of Baker (2000, 2002), a geometric
interpretation of congruity under a separable cost function could be based on the
squared cosine of marginal product vectors. For more general cost functions, the
measure had to be generalized or the agent’s action space had to be refined. The
latter, however, resulted in tasks that are not easily explained in terms of elemen-
tary tasks because they include negative levels of the initial actions. Therefore,
while the cosine measure can be formally restored as a metric of congruity, even
1This fact is illustrated best by a geometrical argument: the redefinition described is simply
a rotation of the natural basis.
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under effort interaction, an economic interpretation seems to require the more
general metric of congruity proposed in this paper.
Probably the most important fact revealed by considering task interdependen-
cies is that performance measure congruity, as measured by the metrics proposed
in the literature, is not the primary goal in performance measure selection, even
in the absence of risk sharing issues. It is only useful by the extent to which it
supports the alignment of the agent’s action with the principal’s objectives.
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Figure 1: Congruity of measures and actions
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